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Abstract 
 
 
We investigate why banks pressured research analysts to provide aggressive assessments of 
issuing firms during the 1990s. This competitive strategy did little to directly increase a bank’s 
chances of winning lead-management mandates and ultimately led to regulatory penalties and 
costly structural reform. We show that aggressively optimistic research and even the mere 
provision of research coverage for the issuer (regardless of its direction) attract co-management 
appointments. Co-management appointments are valuable because they help banks establish 
relationships with issuers. These relationships, in turn, substantially increase their chances of 
winning more lucrative lead-management mandates in the future. This is true even in the 
presence of historically exclusive banking relationships. If recent regulatory reforms compromise 
this entry mechanism, they may have the unintended consequence of diminishing competition 
among securities underwriters. 
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Analyst behavior.  
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1. Introduction 
A substantial literature documents research analysts’ systematic tendency to issue optimistic 
recommendations (see Hong and Kubik (2003) and the citations therein). Such optimism is widely 
believed to be solicited by investment bankers within an analyst’s firm to gain advantage in 
competition for underwriting mandates, and this problem is perceived to have been more severe 
during the late 1990s. But Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (LMW, 2006) demonstrate that banks 
competing to lead manage U.S. debt or equity offerings between 1993 and 2002 did not 
systematically gain immediate competitive advantage when their research analysts provided 
aggressively positive assessments of the issuing firm’s prospects in close proximity to the offering 
at hand. Instead, the strength of prior underwriting and lending relationships and the bank’s 
reputation were the strongest determinants of issuers’ choice among lead-bank candidates. These 
results beg the question why some banks apparently encouraged the behavior that led to penalties 
and structural reforms imposed under the 2003 “Global Settlement.”1 
LMW (2006, pp. 337-8) conjecture that “banks knew they stood little chance of being selected 
as lead manager in the absence of a prior relationship with the issuer, but nevertheless pressured 
their analysts into making aggressive recommendations in the hope of being included in the 
underwriting syndicate.” In this paper, we directly test this conjecture by examining whether analyst 
behavior favorably influences the issuer’s choice of co-managers and thereby enables the co-
managers to compete more effectively for more lucrative lead-management opportunities in the 
future. Co-managers appeared with increasing frequency during the 1990s as some issuers sought 
wider analyst coverage and market making capacity (Corwin and Schultz (2005)). Although co-
managers exercise little influence over the transaction and enjoy modest immediate financial gains 
                                                           
1 In large part, the Settlement aimed to further separate investment banking from research functions. For details, see the 
Securities and Exchange Commission press release at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm. 
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compared to lead managers, they do have contact with the issuer. Such contact might serve as a 
stepping-stone to more lucrative lead-management opportunities in the future if, as LMW show, 
issuers tend to award lead management mandates to their relationship banks and co-management is 
a meaningful step toward building a relationship.  
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we test whether co-management opportunities induce 
aggressive analyst behavior. We then test whether aggressive research increases the likelihood that 
an analyst’s bank wins a co-management mandate. Finally, we investigate whether relationships 
established through co-management eventually increase the likelihood of winning lead-management 
mandates in the future.  
We find that co-management opportunities do induce aggressive analyst behavior: Analysts 
issue relatively more bullish recommendations and upgrades ahead of equity and debt transactions 
that offer good prospects of future rewards. Importantly, they do so only if the issuer is planning to 
hire co-managers for the transaction; otherwise, analyst behavior is unchanged. Aggressive 
recommendations and upgrades, in turn, increase a bank’s chances of winning co-management 
appointments. This contrasts with LMW’s finding that aggressive research undermined efforts to 
win lead management mandates. It is consistent with LMW’s conjecture that banks may have put 
pressure on their analysts to provide flattering research, not in the hope of becoming lead manager 
but of becoming co-manager. Banks engaging in such behavior were typically second-tier equity 
underwriters or large debt underwriters, a group of banks which overlaps to a large extent with the 
commercial banks that entered the underwriting business during the 1990s.  
Even the mere provision of coverage – regardless of its direction – can help a bank. Ahead of 
equity transactions, for instance, the likelihood of becoming co-manager increases from 2.3% to 
17.3% when the bank provides research coverage, all else equal. This result is consistent with the 
oft-heard conjecture that issuers “buy” analyst coverage with co-management appointments.  
  
3 
 
Does aggressive research pay off? We estimate a lead-manager selection model similar to that 
used by LMW but also conditioning on the prospective lead manager’s past co-management 
relationships with the issuer. Banks that have established co-management relationships with the 
issuer enjoy a significant advantage in the competition for lead management mandates, increasing 
their expected probability of being selected as equity lead manager by 49% compared to a bank 
with no relationship. The result holds even in cases where the issuer previously maintained an 
exclusive relationship with another bank.  
We believe that these findings are important for two reasons. First, they shed light on the 
mechanism by which banks gain entry to securities underwriting. The evidence suggests that less 
reputable banks, having less to lose than their more reputable competitors, risk their credibility to 
gain entry. Perhaps such risk-taking is simply a way for these banks to capture the attention of 
issuing firms. Issuing firms might have little to lose from identifying them as co-managers while 
gaining a low-cost means of boosting their share prices. If by doing so, the issuer grooms a credible 
competitor for future mandates, it diminishes the threat of being “captured” by its existing 
relationship bank(s). This remains very much an open question but one worthy of further 
exploration.  
Second, this competitive dynamic suggests a paradoxical policy implication. Issuers have 
incentive to engage a reputable lead manager to enhance their credibility when prospective investors 
are less well informed. But a strong reputation is not easily established or transferred. Thus, the 
reputation-intensive nature of investment banking creates a substantial barrier to entry, and the 
industry has drawn criticism for anti-competitive behavior throughout its existence.2 The 1990s 
were noteworthy in this regard for the large number of commercial banks seeking to enter securities 
                                                           
2 See Morrison and Wilhelm (2004) and Levin and Tadelis (2005) for models of reputation development and transfer, 
and Morrison and Wilhelm (2007) for applications to investment banking.  
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underwriting during the transition to the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. Even the most prominent 
commercial banks were not immediately credible competitors upon entering the securities 
underwriting business, especially on the equity side. If co-management is an important mechanism 
for clearing the reputational entry barrier, and analyst optimism is an effective means of gaining 
such opportunities, our findings suggest a pro-competitive effect that should be weighed against 
concerns for any distortion that might arise from investors relying on optimistic research. 
Our findings complement recent research on syndication practices. Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) 
view syndicates as a response to moral hazard in teams when investment banks engage in 
information production. Corwin and Schultz (2005) provide support for this interpretation as well as 
a detailed characterization of IPO syndicates during the late 1990s. Our analysis of both new and 
seasoned issues of debt and equity reinforces Corwin and Schultz’s conclusions regarding the 
importance of reciprocity in selecting syndicate members using measures of connectedness derived 
from social network analysis.3  
2. The Evolution of the Co-management Function 
Using data from Thomson Financial’s SDC database, Figure 1 shows considerable variation in 
the frequency with which underwriting syndicates were co-managed between 1970 and 2003. The 
long-run trend reflects an increasing (decreasing) tendency toward co-management of equity (debt) 
deals. Both saw an increase in co-management in the early 1970s. From the mid-1970s until the late 
1980s, co-management was less common. This pattern reversed in 1990, perhaps not coincidentally 
in parallel with the growing participation by commercial banks in securities underwriting shown in 
Figure 2. Deregulation began in 1987, culminating in the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. 
Commercial banks now act as co-managers in virtually all debt transactions and around two-thirds 
of equity transactions (conditional on the deal involving co-managers). This is clear evidence of 
                                                           
3 Robinson and Stuart (2006) and Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) apply social network analysis to finance.  
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entry into underwriting co-management involving well-capitalized competitors. 
The 1990s also saw declining exclusivity in relationships among lead- and co-managers. Figure 
3 plots the average annual number of co-managers with which a lead bank worked (weighted by the 
lead bank’s market share so that the experience of more active banks is given greater weight). In 
1970, the average lead bank in equity deals had only 5.3 unique co-management partners. This rose 
sharply during the 1990s peaking at 46.3 in 2000. Debt syndicates followed a similar pattern.4  
Assuming that lead managers prefer not to share fees and prestige with co-managers (as Corwin 
and Schultz (2005) suggest), it appears that market conditions during the 1990s forced banks to 
share control over syndicate structure with issuing firms. Increasing competition from commercial 
banks is one plausible explanation for this change. But it is worth noting that the 1990s were a 
period of extremely heavy securities issuance, especially during the dot-com era, in which case 
capacity constraints might have forced prominent banks to share the burden more widely with co-
managers. Figure 3 sheds light on this point by also plotting real annual aggregate proceeds raised 
by non-financial U.S. issuers. The correlation between the average number of unique co-
management partners and issuance activity is especially strong for equity offerings. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Sample and Data 
We use SDC to identify all debt and equity offerings by U.S. issuers completed between 
December 1, 1993 and June 30, 2002. We begin in 1993 because the I/B/E/S database tracks analyst 
recommendations only from Q4 1993. We end in June 2002 because the NYSE and the NASD 
introduced new rules in July 2002 aimed at reducing conflicts of interest between investment 
research and investment banking (see Kadan et al. (2005) for an overview of these changes). 
                                                           
4 The rising number of co-management partnerships reflects a fundamental change in exclusivity rather than the 
persistence of a small number of strong syndicate relationships alongside a large number of incidental partnerships.  
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We exclude deals that a) were not underwritten, b) involved no co-managers, c) in SIC 60-69 
(financial institutions, etc.) or SIC 90-99 (government agencies, etc.), and d) by non-U.S. issuers. 
To keep the sample size manageable, we include only deals lead-managed by one of the 50 largest 
underwriters (by market share) during the deal year. These banks account for 93.9% of deals in 
SDC. Applying these filters yields 8,303 transactions. The distribution of different transaction types 
is reported in Table 1. Public common stock and public nonconvertible debt offerings account for 
58.4% and 35.0% of sample deals, respectively, but public debt dominates in dollar terms. 
LMW’s sample contains 16,625 offerings. It is constructed like ours, except they include 
offerings that do not involve co-managers (accounting for 52% of their deals). Compared to their 
sample, we have relatively fewer private offerings (reflecting the fact that these rarely involve co-
managers) and relatively more common stock offerings.  
3.2 Sample of Candidate Banks Competing for Co-management Positions 
Estimating a bank’s chances of becoming co-manager requires data for both the successful bank 
and its competitors. In the case of a debt (equity) transaction, we treat as co-management candidates 
the 50 banks with the largest debt (equity) underwriting market share that year (ignoring the bank(s) 
chosen to lead-manage the transaction).5,6 Over the 1993-June 2002 sample period, the Top 50 
banks had a combined 94.9% market share of equity co-management and a 98.1% market share of 
debt co-management.  
3.3 Bank-firm Relationships 
Like LMW, we measure the strength of bank-firm equity, debt, and lending relationships as the 
bank’s share of the firm’s equity, debt, and loan proceeds over the five years preceding quarter t, 
respectively (see Table 2 for all formal variable definitions). The sample period saw a substantial 
                                                           
5 This contrasts with LMW’s model of the lead manager choice, which focuses on the 16 largest banks as of 2002 (and 
their respective predecessor banks in the case of mergers). Our results are robust to their sample restriction. 
6 By construction, a commercial bank competes for a co-management mandate prior to the repeal of the Glass-Steagall 
Act only if it had a Section 20 subsidiary with Tier II securities underwriting authority. 
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number of mergers and acquisitions among banks, so we allow underwriters to inherit their 
predecessors’ relationships. For instance, after its November 1997 merger, Salomon Smith Barney 
is treated as having relationships with both Smith Barney’s and Salomon Brothers’ former clients.  
Table 3 reports summary statistics, broken down by whether or not the candidate bank was 
chosen as co-manager for the deal in question. Compared to LMW’s statistics for lead manager 
candidates, it is rare for co-management candidates to have worked for the issuer. The average 
successful candidate bank had lead-managed 3.1%, 3.7%, and 3.4% of the issuing company’s 
equity, debt, and loan transactions by value over the prior five years, respectively. By comparison, 
the unsuccessful candidate banks had significantly weaker relationships with the issuing company.  
3.4 Bank-bank (Syndicate) Relationships 
We define the strength of a syndicate relationship between two banks as one bank’s share of the 
other bank’s portfolio of co-managers in the previous year t. We take bank mergers into account 
such that a lead’s relationship measure with the surviving co-manager equals the sum of its 
relationship measures with the two pre-merger banks. We similarly account for mergers among lead 
managers. Our econometric models control for the candidate bank’s prior-year participation in the 
lead manager’s syndicates and the lead manager’s prior-year participation in syndicates led by the 
candidate bank. The latter is a natural measure of the sort of reciprocity observed by Corwin and 
Schultz (2005) in the IPO market. As Table 3 shows, banks chosen as co-managers have 
significantly stronger syndicate relationships with the lead, and vice versa, than do the other banks.  
Two further variables help measure a bank’s position in the pecking order of syndication 
partners. Based on social network analysis, we view banks as better networked the more frequently 
they are chosen as syndication partners by other banks. A candidate bank’s indegree equals the 
number of unique banks it has syndicated with in the prior calendar year, normalized by the number 
of possible syndication partners. It varies from zero (for a bank that has syndicated with no other 
banks) to one (for a bank that has syndicated with every bank). Table 3 shows that the average 
  
8 
 
successful candidate bank had co-managed deals with 7.6% of all banks; this is significantly greater 
than the average indegree of 4.0% among unsuccessful candidate banks.  
While indegree captures a bank’s popularity as co-manager, it does not allow for reputation 
differences among its syndication partners. For instance, a bank may achieve high indegree without 
ever working with a bulge-bracket bank. Assuming status and influence derive, in part, from being 
networked to others who themselves are well-networked, we construct a second measure of network 
position called eigenvector centrality (Bonacich (1972)). This measure weights a bank’s ties to 
others by the importance of the banks it is tied to. As Table 3 shows, banks chosen as co-managers 
have relationships with significantly better-networked banks than do other candidate banks. 
3.5 Bank Characteristics  
To proxy for reputation, we use a bank’s prior-year shares of the debt and equity underwriting 
markets (see Megginson and Weiss (1991)). We also compute its syndicated loan market share 
(using DealScan data) to proxy for a bank’s capacity to sweeten its bids by tying lending to capital 
market transactions. (Following a merger, the surviving bank is credited with its predecessors’ 
market shares.) Lead banks may be reluctant to work with co-managers of lower reputation, so we 
control for the absolute difference between the lead’s market share (in the relevant type of security) 
and that of the candidate bank. Table 3 illustrates that successful candidate banks have, on average, 
significantly higher equity, debt, and loan market shares than other candidate banks, and that they 
are significantly closer in market share to the lead than are other candidate banks.  
We include LMW’s loyalty index measuring how often a bank retains its clients in consecutive 
deals as a control for unobserved factors that affect an issuer’s choice, such as execution capability. 
(Banks whose clients are generally loyal likely have more desirable characteristics.) The average 
successful candidate bank has a loyalty index of 55%, versus 41% for unsuccessful candidate banks.  
The final bank characteristic reported in Table 3 indicates that commercial banks are over-
represented among successful candidate banks: They co-manage 39.8% of sample transactions and 
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account for 34.3% of the unsuccessful candidates. We explore several explanations for this fact in 
the econometric analysis but note again that commercial banks entered the underwriting business 
aggressively over the sample period, sometimes by acquiring an investment bank.  
3.6 Research Coverage, Analyst Behavior, and Analyst Reputation 
We classify a candidate bank as providing research coverage if one of its analysts has issued at 
least one report on the issuer in the two years preceding the transaction in hand, according to the 
First Call and I/B/E/S databases.7 Successful candidate banks cover an issuing company’s stock 
ahead of 40.9% of sample transactions, compared to only 8.1% among unsuccessful banks.  
Like LMW we focus on recommendations net of consensus, by subtracting from an analyst’s 
latest recommendation in the two-year window prior to a deal the median recommendation of all 
analysts covering the issuer’s stock.8 This ensures comparability across firms and provides a natural 
measure of an analyst’s optimism. Since we reverse score recommendations such that 5=strong buy, 
positive values correspond to relatively optimistic recommendations. Not surprisingly, the average 
and median relative recommendations in our sample are nearly zero. 93.9% lie between –1 and +1, 
so we mostly capture recommendations that are within one notch of the consensus. On this measure, 
successful candidate banks are significantly more aggressive than other banks. 
We also allow for the possibility that analysts upgrade their recommendations ahead of a deal in 
the hope of influencing the issuer’s co-manager choice. Like LMW, we measure relative upgrades 
as the change between an analyst’s two most recent recommendations, net of the median change, 
requiring these recommendations to be no older than nine months and 24 months, respectively.9 
                                                           
7 The overlap between I/B/E/S and First Call is only 46.8% over our sample period. We merge I/B/E/S and First Call by 
CRSP permno and standardized broker name using a 14-day window to allow for date misreporting and reversing First 
Call’s broker code reassignments. First Call does not report analyst names. We identify analysts from adjacent I/B/E/S 
recommendations or the (more comprehensive) I/B/E/S earnings forecast database. We also use earnings forecasts along 
with the recommendations databases to code whether a bank provides research coverage of an issuer’s stock.  
8 Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2007) report widespread and nonrandom problems in the I/B/E/S historical 
recommendations database. We correct for these problems.  
9 Absent another report in the nine months before the deal, upgrade is coded as zero. If coverage is initiated in the nine 
months before the deal, we assume an implicit prior neutral opinion. Our results are robust to alternative coding choices.  
  
10 
 
Positive values represent relatively aggressive upgrades. Both successful and unsuccessful 
candidate banks show a similar tendency to upgrade their recommendations ahead of deals. 
We control for five analyst characteristics, each defined in Table 2. The first identifies all-star 
analysts. Table 3 shows that candidate banks are more likely to act as co-manager if they employ an 
all-star analyst who covers the issuer’s stock. In the absence of coverage, the bank receives a boost 
if it employs an all-star analyst who at least covers the issuer’s Fama-French (1997) industry.  
The second proxy assumes that an analyst’s reputation derives, in part, from forecasting ability 
and so measures her relative forecast accuracy (constructed as in Hong and Kubik (2003)). We also 
control for an analyst’s tendency to issue optimistic forecasts and the intensity with which an 
analyst follows the stocks she covers (in each case relative to her sector peers). Economically, the 
differences in average relative forecast accuracy, optimism, and coverage intensity are small.  
Our final proxy captures the fact that more senior analysts (measured by years since first 
appearance in I/B/E/S) typically make bolder recommendations (Hong et al. (2000)). Conditional on 
providing coverage, analysts at successful banks are more experienced than their peers. 
4. The Econometric Model 
Our focus is on the determinants of a bank j’s likelihood of co-managing a company k’s offering 
at time t conditional on company k having selected bank i as its lead manager. We treat the 50 
largest underwriting banks for the year in which the deal takes place (excluding the lead manager) 
as potential candidates for the co-management assignment and estimate two types of model. 
4.1 Model 1: The Effect of Aggressive Analyst Recommendations 
Model 1 relates co-manager choice to the analyst’s behavior, recognizing that when making 
recommendations, analysts trade off their private career concerns against any benefits co-operation 
with their investment banking colleagues may yield. Like LMW, we take into account that 
recommendations are observed only if the analyst decided to cover the issuer’s stock: 
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 Pr(bank j co-manages company k’s deal at t | bank j covers k’s stock at t) = fM(R, XM) (1) 
 R = (j’s recommendation for k’s stock | bank j covers k’s stock at t) = fR(XR) (2) 
 Pr(bank j covers company k’s stock at t) = fC(XC) (3) 
The explanatory variables in matrix XM were discussed in Sections 3.3-3.6. All else equal, we 
expect a higher probability of success among more reputable candidate banks that maintain strong 
relationships with the issuer and the lead bank, and which employ more reputable analysts who 
provide coverage for the issuer at time t. Matrices XR and XC contain other identifying variables as 
discussed below. To keep the model relatively simple, we do not model the decision whether to hire 
co-managers in the first place. In Section 5.3, we use variation in the presence of co-managers to 
help identify analyst behavior. 
Equations (1) through (3) form a simultaneous equations system with endogenous switching. 
(See Li and Prabhala (2007) for a discussion of the LMW model.) The system is estimated in two 
steps. First, we estimate the reduced-form determinants of analyst behavior, R = {relative upgrade, 
relative recommendation}, as a function of the costs and benefits of inflating a recommendation. 
Since R is observed only when there is coverage, we account for the resulting selectivity problem, 
under which OLS yields biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates, by using Heckman’s (1979) 
selection correction. Second, we estimate equation (1) replacing R with the fitted values Rˆ  from 
the first step. The probit likelihood function also is adjusted for selectivity bias. Standard errors are 
estimated consistently following Murphy and Topel (1985). Where there is no coverage, we 
estimate a single-equation probit model of equation (1), again corrected for selectivity.  
Since our measures of analyst behavior R are normalized by the recommendation behavior of 
other banks, their coefficients in equation (1) indicate whether a bank is more likely to win a co-
management mandate if its analyst behaved more aggressively than did other analysts.  
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We identify the system using a priori exclusion restrictions on the parameter vector. We follow 
LMW’s selection of instruments by including in equation (2) four proxies for the amount of 
pressure analysts might be subjected to. The first instrument is the underwriting fee relative to the 
bank’s total prior-year underwriting fee income.10,11 Presumably, banks put more pressure on their 
analysts when competing for deals that would make a large contribution to their underwriting 
revenue. To the extent that the size of the bonus pool increases with the bank’s expected 
underwriting profits, this proxy will correlate with unobserved bonuses promised to analysts in 
return for inflated recommendations.  
The second instrument captures variation in the value of co-management positions. More active 
issuers have greater fee potential and thus attract more competition, not least because the prospect 
of establishing a relationship and so becoming a contender for more lucrative lead-management 
roles in future is more tempting. We proxy for future issue activity using the firm’s deal history, 
measured as its cumulative proceeds over the prior five years. Unlike our first instrument, deal 
history varies across firms but not across banks competing for a given deal. Thus, it is designed to 
capture cross-sectional variation in how aggressive analysts as a group are ahead of a given deal. 
Third, LMW argue that a “loyal” client base enables a bank to compete less fiercely and thus 
have less need to pressure its analysts to win underwriting mandates. Finally, we expect analysts to 
come under more pressure when the bank’s underwriting revenue is declining. To capture this, we 
calculate the percentage change in fee revenue relative to the previous year. Both this variable and 
the loyalty index vary across time and banks, but not across issuers. 
In addition to the four bank pressure variables, we include the stock’s price momentum, 
calculated as the cumulative market-adjusted return for the six months preceding the month of the 
                                                           
10 Underwriting fee information missing in SDC is filled in using the same algorithm as in LMW.  
11 To avoid distortions due to small prior-year fee revenue, relative underwriting fee = –ln(1+lagged fee revenue/fee on 
deal). We use the fee paid to the syndicate as a whole assuming co-manager shares are relatively stable across deals. 
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analyst’s most recent recommendation before a deal. Jegadeesh et al. (2004) show that analysts tend 
to recommend past winners, in the sense that consensus recommendations increase in momentum. 
Thus, we expect a positive relation between momentum and an analyst’s recommendation level or 
upgrade. Since analysts make recommendations at different times, momentum varies across analysts 
for a given deal. At the same time, there is no obvious reason to believe that issuers choose co-
managers on the basis of the stock return preceding each analyst’s most recent recommendation. 
4.2 Model 2: The Effect of Providing Research Coverage 
Model 2 relates co-manager choice to the analyst’s decision whether to cover the issuer’s stock 
– regardless of the recommendation level – treating the coverage decision, C, as endogenous: 
 Pr(bank j co-manages company k’s deal at t) = fM(C, XM) (4) 
 C* = Pr(bank j covers company k’s stock at t) = fC(XC) (3) 
The star indicates an unobserved latent variable whose realizations are observed as binary 
outcomes. Equation (3) is the same as in Model 1. As is standard in simultaneous equations models 
where both dependent variables are dichotomous, equations (3) and (4) are estimated as a seemingly 
unrelated bivariate probit model (Greene (2003)). To ensure identification, we include five 
instruments in equation (3). The main one is the fraction of company k’s Fama-French (1997) 
industry that the bank’s analysts provide coverage for. The broader a bank’s existing coverage of an 
industry, the lower the cost of covering company k’s stock, and so the more likely it is that the 
bank’s analyst will publish research about company k. In addition, we control for the size of the fee 
on the deal in hand and the company’s capacity for generating future fee income, both of which 
presumably increase the economic benefit to providing coverage if issuers base their co-manager 
choice on the provision of research. Finally, we control for whether and where the company’s stock 
is listed and how long it has traded.  
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5. Estimation Results 
5.1 The Coverage Model 
Table 4 estimates equation (3) separately for equity and debt deals. Similar to LMW, we find 
that a firm’s stock is more likely to be covered prior to a deal, the stronger its relationship with the 
bank, following a bank merger, when the bank’s analyst already covers a large fraction of the firm’s 
sector, if that analyst is an all-star, the larger the firm’s fee-generating capacity, and the more 
mature the firm. Ahead of debt (but not equity) deals, coverage is less likely for unlisted firms and 
the larger the fee relative to the bank’s prior-year underwriting fee revenue. In many instances, 
especially in the debt specification, the magnitude of these effects is smaller for commercial banks, 
which, all else equal, were less likely to provide coverage. These coverage models condition 
whether we observe analyst behavior ahead of equity and debt deals, which we turn to next. 
5.2 The Analyst Behavior Models 
Table 5 presents estimation results for equation (2) in structural form, for each of the two 
analyst behavior proxies and separately for debt and equity deals, conditioned on the coverage 
decision (i.e., equation (3)). As in LMW, candidate banks with strong equity underwriting 
relationships with the issuer are associated with less aggressive upgrades ahead of equity deals. The 
effects of prior relationships with the lead, eigenvector centrality, and equity market share are 
similarly negative, suggesting that strong standing among syndication partners and a high reputation 
in general diminish the need to compete for underwriting business via aggressive analyst upgrades. 
A bank’s lending capacity provides a second dimension on which it might compete. The negative 
effect of a bank’s prior-year loan market share suggests that lending capacity substitutes for any 
benefits derived from aggressive analyst upgrades. 
In the debt sample, in contrast, strong client (especially debt) relationships, high standing in the 
syndication network, and large debt market shares are associated with more aggressive analyst 
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behavior among co-management candidates. Why would such well-regarded banks promote 
aggressive analyst behavior ahead of debt, and why not also ahead of equity deals? One plausible 
explanation is that aggressive research might have been perceived as providing a competitive edge 
to the sub-bulge bracket investment banks with relatively strong client and peer relationships. These 
investment banks faced the greatest initial exposure to commercial bank competition, especially in 
the debt markets, which were the primary focus of commercial bank entry.  
As in the equity markets, a strong reputation for equity underwriting is associated with less 
aggressive analyst behavior in the debt markets which – if the greatest prestige in securities 
underwriting derives from success in equities underwriting – provides a rationale for some 
candidate banks’ apparent reluctance to sacrifice their reputations by pressuring their analysts 
toward producing biased research. 
All-star analysts are less likely to be associated with aggressive upgrades ahead of both equity 
and debt deals as one would expect if analysts value their reputations, though as in LMW there is 
evidence that the sign flips during the bubble years. More accurate forecasting ability is associated 
with more aggressive recommendation behavior in all specifications suggesting that aggressive 
behavior reflects, at least in part, legitimate boldness among more competent analysts. We also find 
that analysts who have a tendency to be optimistic make more aggressive recommendations, as do 
analysts who tend to cover their stocks relatively more intensively.  
The Staiger and Stock (1997) tests suggest that our instruments are strong in both debt models 
and borderline strong in the equity models. When the payoff to aggressive behavior is potentially 
larger, as measured by the relative fee size and the log of the issuer’s proceeds from issuance during 
the preceding five years, both analyst recommendations and upgrades are statistically more 
aggressive in advance of debt offerings. In the case of equity offerings, recommendations are 
statistically more aggressive when the relative fee size is larger and upgrades are statistically more 
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aggressive when the log of proceeds variable is larger. Greater client loyalty and rising fee income 
are associated with less aggressive behavior in the debt models, while the momentum variable is 
significant in only one of the specifications, suggesting that individual recommendations are less 
sensitive to momentum than are the consensus recommendations studied by Jegadeesh et al. (2004).  
5.3 Do Co-management Opportunities Induce Aggressive Analyst Behavior? 
The evidence in Table 5 is consistent with the interpretation that (some) analysts adjust their 
behavior ahead of securities offerings in the hope that their banks will be chosen as co-managers. 
An alternative interpretation is that a securities issue signals information that causes analysts to 
revise their opinions for reasons unrelated to their banks’ potential involvement in the deal. To 
discriminate between these alternatives, we exploit the fact that around half the offerings in the U.S. 
employ no co-managers (see Figure 1). Variation in the existence of co-management opportunities 
permits identification of whether such opportunities influence analyst behavior. We should observe 
an analyst responding to the bank pressure instruments (such as the prospective fee income) only to 
the extent that the bank foresees a co-management opportunity.  
We test this prediction by first building a probit model of the decision to have co-managers. 
This rules out the possibility that analyst behavior is unchanged ahead of a lead-only offering 
simply because the company has characteristics (such as its size) that render co-management 
unnecessary. The results, reported in Table 6, suggest that co-management is significantly more 
likely for larger deals, when the lead manager has a strong debt underwriting relationship with the 
issuer, and when the lead is well networked (as measured by eigenvector) but does not often serve 
as co-manager (as measured by indegree). In addition, equity deals are less likely to be co-managed 
if the lead and the issuer have a strong equity underwriting relationship, if the lead is a large equity 
or debt underwriter but a small lender, if the lead is a commercial bank, and the more equity the 
issuer has raised over the prior five years. Debt deals lead-managed by large lenders with 
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particularly loyal clients are less likely to be co-managed, as are deals by infrequent issuers.  
Next, we use the probit models to identify “false positives” or transactions classified as strong 
co-management candidates that were not in fact co-managed. We refer to these cases as “co-
manager-eligible” deals. By construction, the main difference between co-manager-eligible deals 
and sample transactions is that the former did not offer co-management opportunities while the 
latter did. If analysts simply react to information conveyed through the issuer’s decision to raise 
capital, we expect no difference in analyst behavior in the two samples. If instead the prospect of a 
co-management mandate induces (some) analysts to make more aggressive recommendations, we 
expect to see such behavior concentrated among sample deals only.  
Using a 50% predicted probability cut-off, there are 956 equity and 879 debt co-manager-
eligible deals. How do analysts at the 50 largest banks behave ahead of these deals? As Table 7 
shows, there is no evidence that they adjust their behavior in response to the bank pressure 
instruments, as judged by the insignificant Staiger-Stock instrument tests (ranging from 1.3 to 4.1). 
In fact, the equity models have minimal explanatory power. Recommendations are relatively more 
aggressive if the analyst has a history of being relatively optimistic and works for a brokerage house 
with a small investment banking operation. Upgrades are relatively more aggressive if the stock’s 
momentum at the time of the ratings change was stronger (in line with Jegadeesh et al. (2004)). 
Other than that, analyst behavior at the 50 largest banks not involved in an equity transaction that 
offers no co-management opportunities is essentially random.  
The debt specifications have better explanatory power – for instance, banks seem to recommend 
their clients’ stocks aggressively ahead of debt deals in which they do not participate – but again 
there is no evidence that analyst behavior is influenced by co-management opportunities. Quite the 
opposite: Deals that are ostensibly more lucrative (as measured by the fee on the deal relative to the 
bank’s prior-year fee revenue) are associated with less aggressive recommendations.  
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These findings contrast starkly with those shown in Table 5 for analyst behavior ahead of deals 
that did involve co-managers and so provide support for our interpretation of Table 5. The prospect 
of co-management opportunities does indeed seem to induce aggressive analyst behavior. 
5.4 How Do Issuers Choose Co-managers? 
5.4.1 Equity Transactions 
Table 8 summarizes the results from estimating the equity co-manager choice models. The first 
three columns relate to Model 1, the simultaneous equations system with endogenous switching 
described in Section 4.1, which is analogous to LMW’s lead manager choice model. Conditional on 
a bank providing research coverage, we estimate two specifications, one for each measure of analyst 
behavior, shown in columns (1) and (2). Column (3) completes Model 1 by reporting parameter 
estimates in the absence of coverage. Column (4) reports results from estimating Model 2, the 
bivariate probit model described in Section 4.2. Here, we relate co-manager choice to the analyst’s 
decision to cover the issuer’s stock – regardless of the strength of the analyst’s recommendation – 
treating the coverage decision as endogenous. The explanatory power for each model (measured by 
the pseudo-R2) varies between 20.1% (column (3)) and 24.9% (column (4)). 
Conditional on a bank providing research coverage, Model 1 indicates that both aggressive 
recommendations and upgrades increase a bank’s chances of becoming co-manager significantly, 
both statistically and economically: Increasing relative recommendations and upgrades by one 
standard deviation from the mean increases the likelihood of becoming co-manager by 2.6 and 5.2 
percentage points, respectively, from the conditional expectation given coverage of 34.1%. This 
provides direct support for LMW’s conjecture that aggressive analyst research may have been 
motivated by the hope of becoming co-manager rather than lead manager. 
The results from Model 2 in column (4) show that simply covering the issuer’s stock – 
regardless of the direction of opinion – has a positive and statistically significant bearing on a 
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candidate bank’s chances of winning a co-management appointment.12 The effect is large 
economically: Coverage provision increases the likelihood of becoming co-manager from the 
unconditional mean of 2.3% to 17.3%.13 Taken together, these results suggest that equity co-
managers are selected both for their willingness to cover the issuing firm and for providing 
excessively optimistic coverage. 
The strength of bank-firm relationships has a positive and significant effect on a candidate 
bank’s chances of being appointed co-manager in all four models, for instance by up to 5.6 
percentage points for a one standard deviation increase in the strength of prior equity relationships. 
Thus, having an underwriting or lending relationship with the issuer increases one’s chances of 
being appointed a co-manager in the event that the lead-management mandate goes to another bank.  
In all four columns, the coefficients for the candidate bank’s participation in the lead bank’s 
prior-year syndicates are positive and significant. This is consistent with lead managers having 
favorable influence at the margin on the issuer’s decision whether to select a co-manager with 
whom the lead manager has worked frequently in the past. The positive (and sometimes significant) 
coefficients for the lead bank’s participation in the candidate’s previous syndicates suggest an 
element of reciprocity of the sort identified by Corwin and Schultz (2005) for IPOs in the late 
1990s. Economically, these effects are comparable in magnitude to those of bank-firm relationships. 
The coefficients for indegree and eigenvector centrality indicate that both syndicate 
relationships with a wide variety of different banks and those with the most prominent banks have 
independent, positive, and statistically significant effects on a candidate bank’s chances of being 
appointed a co-manager. Eigenvector has the larger economic effect, with a one standard deviation 
increase nearly doubling the likelihood of becoming co-manager in column (4). 
                                                           
12 This recalls earlier findings that the provision of coverage influences the lead manager choice of recent IPO firms for 
their first SEO; see Cliff and Denis (2005) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2005). 
13 The unconditional expectation is a little higher than 1 in 50 as some deals involve more than one co-manager. 
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The control variables for candidate-bank and lead-bank characteristics shed light on potential 
tensions among issuers, lead managers, and prospective co-managers. A candidate bank’s debt and 
equity underwriting market shares do not affect its chances of becoming co-manager (other than in 
the absence of coverage). Assuming that issuers always prefer more reputable banks, other things 
equal, this result suggests that lead managers exercise influence in the co-management decision that 
cuts against their more reputable competitors. However, such efforts are undermined when the 
candidate bank has significant lending capacity, which has a positive and generally significant 
effect on the probability of being selected as co-manager. Since commercial banks were the 
predominant source of loans during the sample period, this finding is consistent with the idea that 
commercial banks used their lending capacity to gain co-management appointments.  
When there is a wide gap between its reputation and that of the lead bank, a co-management 
candidate appears less viable: All else equal, a one standard deviation increase in the absolute 
difference in equity market shares is nearly enough to reduce the bank’s chances of becoming co-
manager to zero. When we interact this variable with a dummy variable indicating whether the lead 
bank is a top ten equity underwriter, we find that the most reputable banks are either more willing or 
have little choice but to work with substantially less reputable co-managers. The latter explanation 
is more plausible if the most reputable banks are less inclined to play second fiddle when a highly 
reputable competitor is chosen ahead of them to lead a deal. 
Finally, there is evidence in columns (3) and (4) that banks can to some extent buy deal flow 
through acquisitions. 
As for analyst characteristics, candidate banks employing more reputable analysts are more 
likely to be chosen as co-manager. In columns (1) and (2), the effect of the all-star status and 
seniority of the analyst who provides coverage for the issuer’s stock is positive and significant. In 
columns (3) and (4), where we include cases of noncoverage, we recode the all-star variable to 
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capture whether an all-star analyst at the candidate bank provided coverage for the issuer’s Fama-
French industry at the time of the deal in hand. This significantly improves the chances of becoming 
co-manager, and the economic magnitude of the effect in column (4) is similar to that of strong 
bank-firm relationships. Interestingly, issuers seem to avoid analysts with a reputation for intensive 
coverage, whereas neither forecast accuracy nor forecast optimism affect co-manager choice. 
In sum, the determinants of equity co-manager choice likely reflect both the issuer’s preferences 
and those of the (pre-determined) lead manager. All else equal, covering the issuer’s stock appears 
to serve co-management candidates well, as do aggressive recommendations and upgrades – in 
marked contrast to the negative effects found by LMW. This may explain why banks appear to have 
inflated their recommendation levels ahead of equity deals, even though doing so did not boost their 
chances of serving as lead manager. Instead, the “reward” may have been selection as co-manager. 
Other things equal, more reputable banks are not more likely to be appointed co-manager except in 
so far as their reputation derives from lending capacity, as would more typically be the case for a 
commercial bank. Though rare, some issuers maintain multiple bank relationships and appear to 
“rotate” through their relationship banks from deal to deal, with the non-winning banks being 
selected as co-managers. Co-manager choice also appears to be influenced by the extent to which a 
candidate bank is well connected among its peers in general and the lead manager in particular.  
5.4.2 Debt Transactions 
As in the equity models, aggressive recommendation levels and upgrades significantly increase 
a bank’s chances of becoming co-manager in Table 9, by 3.1 and 1.2 percentage points from the 
7.1% probability conditional on coverage, respectively. By contrast, LMW find that aggressive 
recommendations significantly reduce a candidate bank’s chance of becoming lead manager in debt 
offerings. Again, a greater probability of being appointed co-manager may explain LMW’s finding.  
Compared to the equity sample in Table 8, providing research coverage ahead of debt 
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transactions (column (4)) yields a more modest increase in a bank’s chances of becoming co-
manager, from the unconditional likelihood of 3.4% to 7.0%, all else held equal. 
The effects of the other covariates in Table 9 largely mirror those shown in Table 8, with two 
notable exceptions. The first is that the all-star dummy is negative and significant in the 
noncoverage (column (3)) and endogenous coverage specifications (column (4)). One interpretation 
is that the most reputable banks, employing the top analysts, will not stoop to co-managing debt 
deals. This seems plausible given that narrower spreads on debt transactions make co-management 
for them even less attractive in this context than in equity deals. The second exception is that debt 
issuers show some tendency to avoid analysts with a history of optimistic earnings forecasts.  
5.4.3 Co-manager Choice by Lead Manager Type 
We briefly investigate how the determinants of co-manager choice differ in deals lead-managed 
by investment banks versus commercial banks. In untabulated tests, we find that the beneficial 
effects of providing coverage and of aggressive analyst behavior are largely concentrated in the 
4,102 equity deals and 2,647 debt deals that are lead-managed by an investment bank rather than in 
the 778 equity deals and 776 debt deals lead-managed by a commercial bank. If syndicate choice is 
largely up to the lead manager, as some of our previous evidence suggests, investment banks appear 
to choose their co-managers partly on the basis of their demonstrated willingness to put pressure on 
their analysts, while other considerations matter more to commercial banks.  
Consistent with this interpretation, we find in unreported tests that commercial banks are 
significantly more likely to choose investment banks as their co-managers in equity deals that they 
lead-manage, while the reverse is true in debt deals. Since commercial banks entered the debt 
markets earlier and more successfully than the equity markets, this suggests that distribution 
capacity and access to investor networks matter more to commercial bank leads than do any boosts 
they may derive from a co-manager’s analyst stimulating demand for the stock.  
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5.5 Does Co-management Yield Lead-management Opportunities? 
We now investigate whether co-management opportunities serve as a stepping-stone to more 
lucrative lead-management opportunities. To do so, we estimate a version of Model 2 for the lead-
management choice while controlling for a candidate bank’s past co-management relationships with 
a prospective issuer.14 We do so in the complete sample of deals lead-managed by the 50 largest 
banks during 1993-2002, that is, we include deals that did not themselves involve co-managers.  
The results in columns (1) and (3) of Table 10 show that banks are indeed more likely to win 
lead-management mandates if they have previously established strong ties with the issuer through 
co-management. This is true for both equity and debt transactions, and in each case, banks benefit 
both from having previously acted as debt and as equity co-managers. To illustrate the magnitude of 
the effect, note that the predicted probability of becoming equity lead manager for an otherwise 
average bank without an underwriting relationship with the issuer is 1.1%. By how much can the 
bank boost its chances of becoming lead manager by first establishing a co-manager relationship? 
From Table 8, the predicted probability of becoming co-manager, conditional on providing 
coverage, is 17.3%. The predicted probability of subsequently becoming lead-manager, conditional 
on having been a co-manager in the past and on coverage, is 9.5%. The expected increase in the 
probability of becoming lead-manager in the future is hence 0.173 · 0.095 / 0.011 – 1 = 49%.  
The remaining coefficients confirm LMW’s conclusions in the context of our Model 2 
specifications. Banks are more likely to win both equity and debt lead-management mandates, the 
stronger their lead-management underwriting relationships, the larger their market share in the 
respective market, the greater their presence in the syndicated loan market, and following mergers. 
Providing research coverage is especially beneficial ahead of debt transactions, while employing an 
                                                           
14 We could equally estimate the effect of co-management relationships on lead appointments in the context of Model 1. 
However, Model 2 adds nuance to the results reported in LMW’s version of Model 1 by including coverage. 
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all-star analyst who covers the issuer’s sector helps win equity mandates. In addition, banks that are 
well-connected in terms of high indegree or eigenvector centrality are more likely to be chosen as 
lead-managers. Economically, the eigenvector measure has the largest effect, nearly doubling the 
probability of selection in the equity sample and increasing it by more than 50% in the debt sample.  
5.6 Scaling the Hierarchy in the Face of Exclusive Relationships 
These results may be misleading if issuers “rotate” through a set of relationship banks from deal 
to deal, with the non-winning banks being selected as co-managers, because then the same banks 
will have strong lead and strong co-management ties to the issuer. In columns (2) and (4), we 
restrict the samples to the 1,870 equity and 1,910 debt deals in which the issuer had a single lead-
management relationship and ask whether strong co-management ties help a candidate bank “crack” 
such exclusive firm-bank relationships. Consistent with LMW, we find persistence in relationships 
in the sense that the relationship bank is significantly more likely to be chosen as the lead. But there 
is switching: Fully 711 of the 1,870 equity mandates and 975 of the 1,910 debt mandates are won 
by a bank other than the sole relationship bank, and the positive and significant coefficients in 
columns (2) and (4) confirm that a candidate bank is more likely to become lead manager in an 
equity (debt) deal if it has served as co-manager on the issuer’s prior equity (debt) deals.15  
These results provide a plausible explanation for why banks compete for the apparently modest 
rewards associated with co-management mandates. In a setting where reputational considerations 
impose substantial barriers to entry, success in attracting co-management appointments provides an 
effective means of scaling the hierarchy, even in the presence of strong bank-firm relationships.  
6. Conclusion 
We began the paper by asking why banks pressured their analysts to provide aggressively 
                                                           
15 The unconditional means tell a similar story: Ahead of equity deals, successful candidate banks had average equity 
co-management relationships of 0.158, compared to 0.013 for the unsuccessful banks. The corresponding means ahead 
of debt deals are 0.090 and 0.006. The differences are significant with t-statistics of 44.1 and 45.8, respectively. 
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positive assessments of issuing firms during the 1990s when doing so apparently had little positive 
effect on their chances of receiving lead-management appointments and ultimately led to penalties 
and costly structural reform. Following the conjecture offered by Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm 
(2006) we explore whether such behavior improved a bank’s chances of being appointed co-
manager which, in turn, might have opened the door to more lucrative lead-management 
appointments in the future. Our findings support this conjecture. 
Consistent with the belief that issuers buy analyst coverage with co-management appointments, 
simply providing coverage has a strong positive effect on a bank’s chances of being appointed a co-
manager. Aggressive recommendations or upgrades also significantly increase the chances of being 
appointed co-manager, for both equity and debt offerings. Finally, banks that attract an issuer’s co-
management appointments, and so establish ties with the issuer, are more likely to win more 
lucrative lead-management mandates in the future. This is true even in the hardest-to-win cases 
where the issuer has traditionally maintained an exclusive relationship with another bank.  
In summary, our findings suggest a causal chain consistent with the reputation-intensive nature 
of the securities underwriting business. Aggressive analyst behavior appears to have played some 
role in attracting co-management appointments. Aggressive behavior was concentrated most heavily 
among lower-reputation banks at a time when heavily capitalized commercial banks were 
aggressively pursuing securities underwriting business. The effect was strongest in the debt markets 
where commercial banks first gained their toehold.  
If there is merit in this interpretation, our results suggest a potential unintended anti-competitive 
effect that might arise from the Global Settlement’s separation of research and investment banking. 
Specifically, if separation of these functions compromises the ability to compete for co-management 
appointments via analyst coverage, this provision of the Settlement potentially bears most heavily 
on marginal competitors fighting to climb the securities underwriting ranks. 
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Figure 1. Fraction of equity and debt deals that involve co-managers. 
The graph shows the fraction of equity and debt transactions that involve one or more co-managers between 1970 and 2003 
as reported by Securities Data Corporation, after excluding transactions by firms classified as SIC 60-69 (financial 
institutions, etc.) or SIC 90-99 (government agencies, etc.).  
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Figure 2. Fraction of equity and debt deals that involve commercial banks as co-manager. 
The graph shows the fraction of equity and debt transactions that involves one or more commercial banks as co-managers 
between 1970 and 2003 as reported by Securities Data Corporation, after excluding transactions by firms classified as SIC 
60-69 (financial institutions, etc.) or SIC 90-99 (government agencies, etc.) as well as deals that do not involve co-
managers. Some commercial banks had grandfathered underwriting privileges, allowing them to co-manage underwritten 
securities offerings in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
Debt
Equity
  
29 
 
Figure 3. Weighted average number of co-management partners. 
The figure plots the number of unique co-managers that the average bank has syndication relationships with in a given year 
against the real aggregate proceeds raised by non-financial issuers in the U.S. (in dollars of 2005 purchasing power, 
deflated using the GDP price deflator). We compute a weighted average of co-management partners using each bank’s 
underwriting market share as weights. This gives more weight to the number of partners of the most active underwriters.  
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Table 1. The Sample of Capital-Raising Transactions. 
The sample consists of 8,303 capital-raising transactions completed between December 1, 1993 and June 30, 2002 as reported by Securities Data Corporation, after 
excluding non-underwritten issues; offerings that did not involve co-managers; transactions by firms classified as SIC 6000-6999 (financial institutions, etc.) and 
SIC 9000-9999 (government agencies, etc.); and offerings by non-U.S. corporations. We also require that each deal was lead-managed by one of the 50 largest 
underwriters active that year. Research coverage in the last column requires that the lead manager’s research department publish at least one research report about 
the issuing company in the two years preceding the transaction, based on the First Call and I/B/E/S recommendations databases or the I/B/E/S earnings forecast 
database. All currency amounts are in nominal terms.  
 
      Co-managers  Lead manager 
  
No. 
of 
deals 
% of 
deals 
Aggregate 
amount 
raised 
($m, 
nominal) 
% of 
amt.   
Mean 
number 
Median 
number Range  
Fraction 
of deals 
with 
multiple 
co-
managers 
%   
Mean 
under- 
writing 
market 
share 
% 
% 
comm-
ercial 
banks  
% 
covering 
issuer’s 
stock 
prior to 
the deal  
              
Equity              
 Common stock 4,851 58.4 665,747 42.8  2.2 2 1 – 22 70.7  5.9 15.8 39.6 
 Private common 29 0.3 3,552 0.2  1.7 1 1 – 6 41.4  2.5 41.4 44.8 
Debt              
 Non-convertible debt 2,910 35.0 784,258 50.5  3.8 3 1 – 24 78.3  9.3 22.2 62.7 
 Convertible debt 136 1.6 40,038 2.6  2.8 2 1 – 11 77.9  7.8 8.8 81.6 
 Private non-conv. debt 142 1.7 11,218 0.7  1.3 1 1 – 10 18.3  3.8 64.8 16.2 
 Private convertible debt 8 0.1 1,071 0.1  2.0 2 1 – 4 62.5  5.8 25.0 75.0 
  
 Non-convertible preferred 107 1.3 15,205 1.0 
 
3.4 3 1 – 16 77.6 
 
11.2 6.5 37.4 
 Convertible preferred 98 1.2 30,739 2.0  3.1 2 1 – 14 68.4  9.4 7.1 84.7 
 Private non-conv. preferred 9 0.1 618 0.0  1.4 1 1 – 2 44.4  3.1 55.6 11.1 
 Private conv. preferred 13 0.2 1,460 0.1  1.1 1 1 – 2   7.7  2.2 38.5 23.1 
              
All deals 8,303 100.0 1,553,905 100.0  2.8 2 1 – 24 72.4  3.6 18.7 48.5 
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Table 2. Main Variable Definitions. 
 
Bank-firm relationships  
bank’s share of firm’s equity deals/debt 
deals/loans  
Let d
tkjP ,,  denote the aggregate proceeds company k raised in deals lead-
managed by bank j over the five years preceding quarter t in deals of type 
d = {loan, equity, debt}. The strength of company k’s type-d relationship 
with bank j is != j
d
tkj
d
tkj
d
tkj PPR ,,,,,, . The equity and debt relationship 
variables are constructed from data for all transactions in SDC, including 
those without co-managers. Lending relationships are based on data from 
the DealScan database. 
Bank-bank relationships  
bank’s participation in lead’s syndicates  The strength of syndicate relationships between every pair of banks i and 
j is != j
d
tji
d
tji
d
tji PPS ,,,,,,  where 
d
tjiP ,,  is the aggregate proceeds from 
deals of type d = {equity, debt} that were lead-managed by bank i and 
that involved bank j as co-manager in the calendar year preceding year t. 
(For deals involving multiple co-managers, each is given equal credit.) 
By construction, 1
,,
=! j
d
tjiS , so 
d
tjiS ,,  is bank j’s share of bank i’s 
portfolio of co-managers in year t-1. 
 
lead’s participation in bank’s syndicates  = d
tijS ,,  
 
indegree centrality  The number of unique banks a bank has syndicated with in the prior 
calendar year, normalized by the number of possible syndication 
partners. Formally, indegree )1()0( ,,, !>=" NSIi
d
tji
d
tj
 where I( ) is an 
indicator function evaluating whether bank j ever served as co-manager 
in deals lead-managed by bank i in year t-1, and N is the number of banks 
active as lead manager that year. 
 
eigenvector centrality  A recursive measure of indegree that weights syndication ties by how 
well networked each syndication partner is. Formally,  
eigenvector !=" i
d
ti
d
tji
d
tj
d
tj EpE ,,,,, . The weights are the reciprocal of the 
principal eigenvector d
tp  of a square and symmetric matrix 
d
tjiA ,,  whose 
cells (i,j) record whether or not banks i and j syndicated one or more 
transactions of type d = {equity, debt} in the preceding year. 
Bank characteristics  
bank reputation A bank’s share of the equity/debt/loan markets during the prior calendar 
year. Following a merger, the surviving bank is credited with both 
predecessors’ market shares. Equity and debt data come from SDC; loan 
market data come from DealScan. 
 
loyalty index  Measures how often a bank retains its clients in consecutive deals as a 
control for unobserved factors such as execution capability that affect an 
issuer’s choice. Let Ick and Irk = 1 if bank j managed k’s penultimate and 
most recent deals, respectively, in the five years to quarter t, and 0 
otherwise. Then j’s loyalty index = Σk Ick Irk / Σk Ick (the number of 
retained clients over the total number of clients).  
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Research coverage and analyst behavior   
coverage  = 1 if the bank’s research department has published at least one research 
report about the issuing company in the two years preceding the 
transaction, based on the First Call and I/B/E/S recommendations 
databases or the I/B/E/S earnings forecast database. 
 
relative recommendation = analyst’s latest recommendation in the two-year window prior to a deal 
minus the median recommendation of all analysts covering the issuer’s 
stock. Recommendations are reverse-scored so that 5=strong buy. 
Positive values denote relatively aggressive recommendations. 
 
relative upgrade Change between an analyst’s two most recent recommendations, net of 
the median change. We require these recommendations to be no older 
than nine months and 24 months, respectively. Positive values denote 
relatively aggressive upgrades. 
Analyst reputation  
all-star analyst Analyst ranked top-three or runner-up in the October Institutional 
Investor issue preceding the deal in hand. 
 
relative forecast accuracy The analyst’s scaled rank (relative to other analysts covering the same 
stocks) of deviations between forecast and subsequent earnings 
realization. 
 
relative forecast optimism The analyst’s scaled rank (relative to other analysts covering the same 
stocks) based on a dummy variable = 1 if the analyst’s forecast for a 
stock exceeds consensus. 
 
relative coverage intensity The analyst’s scaled rank (relative to other analysts covering the same 
stocks) of the number of reports published per annum. 
 
 Each of the three preceding measures is averaged across stocks the 
analyst covers in years t-2 through year t and ranges from 0 to 100, with 
a higher number indicating greater forecast accuracy, optimism, and 
coverage intensity, respectively; see Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) 
and Hong and Kubik (2003). 
 
analyst’s seniority  Years in I/B/E/S database. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics. 
The unit of observation in this table is a bank-deal pair. The dataset consists of 8,303 deals, for each of which the 50 largest 
banks are deemed to compete to be chosen as co-manager (except for debt deals in 2002, when there were fewer than 50 
banks in the market). This gives a sample of 414,760 bank-deal pairs. The column headed ‘co-managers’ refers to the 
20,106 bank-deal pairs involving banks that were awarded co-management assignments, while the column headed ‘other 
candidate banks’ refers to the 394,654 bank-deal pairs involving banks that were eligible to compete for but were not 
chosen as co-manager. For each bank-deal pair, we report the main explanatory variables used in the econometric models. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. The issuer’s industry is based on the 48 Fama-French (1997) industries. We lose some 
observations for relative forecast accuracy, coverage intensity, optimism, and seniority because not all analysts disclose 
their name in the I/B/E/S recommendations file. The last column provides t-tests of differences in means/fractions 
comparing winning to losing banks. 
 
 
Co-
managers  
Other 
candidate 
banks   t-test 
Bank-firm relationships      
mean bank’s share of firm’s equity deals prior 5 years (%) 3.1  0.2  -73.1*** 
mean bank’s share of firm’s debt deals prior 5 years (%) 3.7  0.3  -89.5*** 
mean bank’s share of firm’s loans prior 5 years (%) 3.4  0.4  -74.7*** 
Bank-bank relationships      
mean bank’s participation in lead’s prior-year syndicates (%) 5.1  1.5  -128.6*** 
mean lead’s participation in bank’s prior-year syndicates (%) 4.5  2.0  -52.2*** 
mean indegree centrality (%) 7.6  4.0  -146.1*** 
mean eigenvector centrality (%) 23.8  13.0  132.7*** 
Bank characteristics      
mean bank’s equity market share prior calendar year (%) 3.8  1.6  -88.3*** 
mean bank’s debt market share prior calendar year (%) 4.3  1.6  -105.0*** 
mean bank’s loan market share prior calendar year (%) 0.5  0.1  -36.7*** 
mean abs(lead’s market share – bank’s market share) (%) 6.3  6.7  11.5*** 
mean loyalty index (%) 55.0  41.0  -57.0*** 
fraction commercial banks (%) 39.8  34.3  -16.0*** 
Research coverage, analyst behavior, and analyst reputation      
fraction with coverage (%) 40.9  8.1  -158.3*** 
mean relative recommendation 0.112  -0.030  -13.6*** 
mean relative upgrade 0.108  0.101  -0.6 
fraction of issuers covered by all-star analysts (%) 10.7  1.5  -92.3*** 
fraction with all-star analyst covering the issuer’s industry (%) 51.6  24.7  -85.4*** 
mean relative forecast accuracy 50.6  50.0  -30.7*** 
mean relative forecast optimism 49.8  49.9  5.7*** 
mean relative coverage intensity 49.8  50.0  7.7*** 
mean analyst’s seniority (years in I/B/E/S database) 5.9  4.3  -79.5*** 
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Table 4. Strategic Coverage Decisions. 
We estimate the determinants of the coverage decision using probit MLE (equation (3)). The coverage decision determines 
whether or not we observe the analyst’s behavior in subsequent tables. Therefore, the estimation results in subsequent 
tables are conditioned on the coverage decision using the Heckman (1979) MLE framework, where the coverage decision, 
analyst behavior, and co-manager choice are jointly estimated. For the purpose of illustrating what determines coverage, 
this table shows the results of two stand-alone probits, for equity and debt deals respectively. The dependent variable is an 
indicator equal to one if the bank’s analyst covers the issuer’s stock at any point during the two years preceding the deal, 
based on the First Call and I/B/E/S recommendations databases or the I/B/E/S earnings forecast database. Since commercial 
banks in our sample period are generally less likely to provide research coverage, we interact the main explanatory 
variables with a dummy equaling one for commercial banks. Banks that cover a larger fraction of an issuer’s industry are 
more likely to cover the issuer as well. We control for this using the fraction of the issuing firm’s Fama-French (1997) 
industry that is covered by bank j, measured over the three-year window ending in the year of the deal. The dummy for 
mergers is coded 1 in the quarter of the event, and ½, ⅓, and ¼ in the next three quarters. Intercepts and year effects are not 
shown. Standard errors are shown in italics. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level (two-
sided), respectively. The number of observations is 244,624 in the equity model and 170,136 in the debt model. 
 
 Probit 1: Equity deals  Probit 2: Debt deals 
        
   
× commercial 
bank dummy    
× commercial 
bank dummy 
Bank-firm relationships        
bank’s share of firm’s debt deals prior 5 years 1.028***  -0.603***  0.489***  -0.829*** 
 0.097  0.187  0.056  0.132 
bank’s share of firm’s equity deals prior 5 years 2.162***  -0.526***  1.029***  0.189 
 0.064  0.127  0.064  0.165 
bank’s share of firm’s loans prior 5 years 1.186**  -0.389  0.085  0.455 
 0.418  0.426  0.306  0.313 
Bank characteristics        
bank’s equity market share prior calendar year 0.359  3.788***  0.022  8.023*** 
 0.344  0.955  0.233  0.616 
bank’s debt market share prior calendar year -1.761***  -0.990  0.285  -1.683*** 
 0.334  0.563  0.272  0.461 
bank’s loan market share prior calendar year -1.870  5.000  2.159  -1.452 
 4.356  4.368  2.910  2.932 
=1 if bank involved in merger  0.329***  0.006  0.295***  -0.271*** 
 0.047  0.060  0.038  0.047 
fraction of firm’s Fama-French industry covered 4.773***  -0.208  2.970***  1.964*** 
 0.079  0.138  0.054  0.084 
=1 if bank has all-star analyst covering Fama-French industry  0.185***  -0.152***  0.599***  -0.307*** 
 0.018  0.032  0.015  0.025 
Firm characteristics        
underwriting fee on deal / bank’s prior-year fee income 0.047***  -0.028**  -0.021***  0.058*** 
 0.006  0.011  0.004  0.006 
log firm’s $ equity or debt proceeds prior 5 years  0.190***  -0.013***  0.044***  -0.021*** 
 0.003  0.004  0.002  0.002 
log time since IPO 0.426***    0.065***   
 0.009    0.006   
=1 if firm is not listed 0.037    -0.697***   
 0.084    0.027   
Diagnostics        
LR test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 22,274***  34,378*** 
Pseudo-R2 26.4 %  24.6% 
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Table 5. Analyst Behavior. 
The dependent variables are relative recommendations and relative upgrades. These are observed only when the bank 
covers the stock, so we estimate Heckman (1979) selection models using joint MLE. Representative results for the 
associated selection equation are shown in Table 4. The estimation results in this table are reported in structural form. The 
reduced forms used to generate instruments for the models in Tables 6 and 7 include also the exogenous variables from the 
lead-bank equation and are not shown. The relative upgrade models include a dummy equal to one if the previous 
recommendation was a strong buy; the coefficients, which are negative and significant, are not shown. Analyst 
characteristics are defined as in Table 2. Indegree and eigenvector are orthogonalized against each other to avoid 
multicollinearity problems. The bubble dummy equals 1 for deals completed in 1999 and 2000. The four ‘bank pressure 
proxies’ measure the size of potential rewards for liquidating reputation capital, or equivalently the amount of pressure that 
might be put on an analyst to deliver a favorable recommendation. These are the instruments we use to identify the system. 
The more lucrative the client – as measured by the fee on the deal in question relative to the bank’s prior-year fee pool, and 
by the firm’s deal history – the more tempted the analyst to inflate the recommendation. Banks with more ‘loyal’ clients are 
less likely to resort to inflating analyst forecasts. We also control for time-variation in the bank’s underwriting fee revenue, 
on the assumption that decreases in fee income (relative to the previous year) may prompt more aggressive analyst 
behaviour in an effort to reverse the decline. The momentum variable equals the stock’s cumulative market-adjusted return 
for the six months preceding the month of the analyst’s most recent recommendation before the deal date. It is calculated as 
in Jegadeesh et al. (2004, page 1120). Intercepts are not shown. Standard errors are shown in italics. We use ***, **, and * to 
denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% (two-sided), respectively. The Staiger and Stock (1997) test is a test of the 
strength of the instruments. It is based on an F-test of the joint significance of the instruments in the reduced-form models. 
The critical value for strong instruments is 10. The number of observations where the bank provides research coverage is 
8,891 in the equity model and 22,066 in the debt specifications. 
 
 Equity  Debt 
Relative… 
 
recomm. 
(1)  
upgrades 
(2)  
recomm. 
(3)  
upgrades 
(4) 
Bank-firm relationships        
bank’s share of firm’s debt deals prior 5 years 0.007  -0.089  0.312***  0.098* 
 0.072  0.073  0.044  0.042 
bank’s share of firm’s equity deals prior 5 years 0.012  -0.170***  0.100*  -0.027 
 0.055  0.045  0.042  0.040 
bank’s share of firm’s loans prior 5 years -0.032  -0.057  0.118  -0.198** 
 0.097  0.107  0.073  0.071 
Bank-bank relationships        
bank’s participation in lead’s prior-year syndicates  0.105  -0.562**  -0.101  0.015 
 0.172  0.180  0.135  0.131 
lead’s participation in candidate’s prior-year syndicates 0.163  0.112  0.147*  0.118 
 0.140  0.149  0.073  0.071 
bank’s indegree centrality -0.005  0.005  -0.009***  -0.004 
 0.005  0.005  0.003  0.003 
bank’s eigenvector centrality  0.004  -0.303*  0.413***  0.031 
 0.139  0.148  0.090  0.088 
Bank characteristics        
bank’s equity market share prior calendar year 0.283  0.057  -0.471*  -0.507* 
 0.404  0.425  0.211  0.204 
bank’s debt market share prior calendar year 0.234  0.791*  0.401  0.780** 
 0.344  0.367  0.274  0.265 
bank’s loan market share prior calendar year -0.172  -0.931*  1.082*  0.286 
 0.445  0.437  0.455  0.440 
 
 
Continued over 
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Table 5. Analyst Behavior (continued). 
 
 Equity  Debt 
Relative… 
 
recomm. 
(1)  
upgrades 
(2)  
recomm. 
(3)  
upgrades 
(4) 
Analyst characteristics        
=1 if analyst is ranked ‘all-star’ by Institutional Investor -0.017  -0.053*  0.057***  -0.035* 
 0.026  0.026  0.015  0.014 
… x bubble dummy 0.011  0.144**  0.041  0.018 
 0.047  0.049  0.030  0.029 
relative forecast accuracy 0.395***  0.265**  0.262***  0.177* 
 0.093  0.104  0.072  0.070 
relative forecast optimism 0.377***  0.173**  0.507***  0.114** 
 0.059  0.067  0.041  0.040 
relative coverage intensity -0.042  0.289***  0.075  0.155*** 
 0.075  0.082  0.046  0.044 
log analyst’s seniority (in years) 0.006  -0.022  0.030***  0.000 
 0.012  0.013  0.009  0.008 
Bank pressure proxies        
underwriting fee on deal  / bank’s prior-year fee income  0.064***  -0.005  0.034***  0.009* 
 0.010  0.011  0.004  0.004 
log firm’s $ equity or debt proceeds prior 5 years  0.004  0.017**  0.012***  0.009*** 
 0.007  0.006  0.002  0.002 
loyalty index 0.008  0.020  -0.036  -0.052* 
 0.051  0.059  0.024  0.023 
% change in bank’s fee income relative to previous year -0.018  -0.009  -0.013*  0.008 
 0.010  0.011  0.006  0.006 
Momentum        
cumulative market-adjusted return prior to analyst’s report 0.025  0.033  -0.037  0.124*** 
 0.025  0.028  0.020  0.020 
        
Diagnostics        
Wald test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 148.3***  106.9***  409.5***  138.1*** 
Heckman’s λ (probability of non-coverage) -0.052  -0.011  -0.091***  0.018 
Likelihood ratio test of independent equations (ρ=0) (χ2) 4.0*  0.3  38.0***  1.6 
Staiger-Stock (1997) instrument strength test (F) 9.9***  9.1**  21.2***  14.8*** 
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Table 6. Likelihood of Co-management. 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable set equal to one if the offering involves one or more co-managers, and zero 
otherwise. The estimation sample thus includes not only the 8,303 co-managed offerings described in Table 1 but also the 
1,193 equity and 7,633 debt transactions without co-managers that satisfy our sample criteria. Estimation uses probit MLE. 
Intercepts are not shown. Standard errors are shown in italics. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 
and 5% (two-sided), respectively. “False positive” are transactions that the probits classify as strong co-management 
candidates based on their characteristics (using a 50% predicted probability cut-off) but that did not in fact involve co-
managers. 
 
 Equity  Debt 
 Pr(co-managed)  Pr(co-managed) 
Bank-firm relationships    
bank’s share of firm’s debt deals prior 5 years 0.427***  0.543*** 
 0.060  0.057 
bank’s share of firm’s equity deals prior 5 years -0.529***  -0.079 
 0.089  0.045 
bank’s share of firm’s loans prior 5 years -0.034  -0.063 
 0.168  0.069 
Bank characteristics    
bank’s equity market share prior calendar year -2.736***  -0.462 
 0.738  0.517 
bank’s debt market share prior calendar year -2.056*  -0.576 
 0.804  0.426 
bank’s loan market share prior calendar year 1.647*  -2.567*** 
 0.727  0.502 
Bank characteristics    
loyalty index 0.170  -0.224* 
 0.105  0.113 
=1 if commercial bank -0.224***  -0.055 
 0.051  0.042 
bank’s indegree centrality -0.082***  -0.031*** 
 0.012  0.007 
bank’s eigenvector centrality  3.116***  1.259*** 
 0.277  0.201 
Firm/offering characteristics    
log size of deal 0.372***  0.487*** 
 0.026  0.013 
log firm’s $ equity or debt proceeds prior 5 years  -0.127***  0.048*** 
 0.012  0.005 
Diagnostics    
Pseudo R2 13.0 %  23.2 % 
Wald test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 586.6***  2,154.2*** 
No. of deals 6,073  11,056 
No. of false positives (50% cutoff) 956  879 
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Table 7. Analyst Behavior in Co-manager-eligible Deals that Were Not Co-managed. 
The models estimated are the same as in Table 5. The sample consists of the false positives (co-manager-eligible deals) 
identified from Table 6. There are 956 equity deals and 879 debt lead-only deals whose characteristics suggest they are 
more likely than not to be co-managed (using a 50% predicted probability cut-off in the Table 6 probits). Intercepts are not 
shown. Standard errors are shown in italics. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% (two-
sided), respectively. The Staiger and Stock (1997) test is a test of the strength of the instruments. It is based on an F-test of 
the joint significance of the instruments in the reduced-form models. The critical value for strong instruments is 10. The 
number of observations where the bank provides research coverage is 3,019 in the equity model and 6,283 in the debt 
specifications. 
 
 Equity  Debt 
Relative… 
 
recomm. 
(1)  
upgrades 
(2)  
recomm. 
(3)  
upgrades 
(4) 
Bank-firm relationships        
bank’s share of firm’s debt deals prior 5 years 0.042  -0.087  0.201*  -0.006 
 0.106  0.134  0.083  0.088 
bank’s share of firm’s equity deals prior 5 years 0.129  -0.042  0.334***  0.081 
 0.087  0.081  0.079  0.107 
bank’s share of firm’s loans prior 5 years -0.041  -0.081  0.388***  0.212 
 0.148  0.184  0.115  0.164 
Bank-bank relationships        
bank’s participation in lead’s prior-year syndicates  -0.181  -0.037  -0.046  -0.674** 
 0.260  0.279  0.236  0.255 
lead’s participation in candidate’s prior-year syndicates 0.294  0.453  -0.078  0.157 
 0.266  0.277  0.189  0.128 
bank’s indegree centrality -0.013  0.000  0.006  0.019*** 
 0.009  0.008  0.006  0.005 
bank’s eigenvector centrality  0.001  -0.003  0.001  0.002 
 0.003  0.003  0.002  0.002 
Bank characteristics        
bank’s equity market share prior calendar year -2.130***  -0.590  -0.534  -0.299 
 0.562  0.633  0.394  0.372 
bank’s debt market share prior calendar year 0.802  0.492  0.561  0.949 
 0.521  0.540  0.531  0.542 
bank’s loan market share prior calendar year 0.133  -0.246  -0.524  -1.254 
 0.624  0.399  0.734  0.716 
 
 
 
Continued over 
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Table 7. Analyst Behavior in Co-manager-eligible Deals that Were Not Co-managed (continued). 
 
 Equity  Debt 
Relative… 
 
recomm. 
(1)  
upgrades 
(2)  
recomm. 
(3)  
upgrades 
(4) 
Analyst characteristics        
=1 if analyst is ranked ‘all-star’ by Institutional Investor 0.034  -0.063  0.026  -0.039 
 0.046  0.045  0.029  0.029 
… x bubble dummy -0.077  0.078  -0.028  -0.018 
 0.074  0.070  0.057  0.053 
relative forecast accuracy 0.285  0.075  0.470**  -0.093 
 0.177  0.184  0.155  0.147 
relative forecast optimism 0.299**  0.188  0.612***  0.096 
 0.107  0.121  0.090  0.083 
relative coverage intensity -0.022  0.098  -0.143  0.119 
 0.129  0.146  0.082  0.083 
log analyst’s seniority (in years) 0.000  -0.025  -0.016  -0.052** 
 0.022  0.025  0.017  0.017 
Bank pressure proxies        
underwriting fee on deal  / bank’s prior-year fee income  -0.004  -0.007  -0.024**  -0.010 
 0.019  0.019  0.009  0.008 
log firm’s $ equity or debt proceeds prior 5 years  -0.012  0.006  -0.002  0.008 
 0.008  0.011  0.007  0.006 
loyalty index -0.064  0.164  -0.068  -0.129** 
 0.108  0.113  0.047  0.048 
% change in bank’s fee income relative to previous year -0.004  0.000  -0.016  -0.008 
 0.017  0.018  0.012  0.011 
Momentum        
cumulative market-adjusted return prior to analyst’s report 0.071  0.196***  -0.187**  -0.024 
 0.040  0.061  0.062  0.050 
        
Diagnostics        
Wald test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 26.6  55.0***  133.1***  59.3*** 
Heckman’s λ (probability of non-coverage) 0.032  -0.089*  0.048  0.017 
Likelihood ratio test of independent equations (ρ=0) (χ2) 0.6  6.3*  2.5  0.3 
Staiger-Stock (1997) instrument strength test (F) 2.5  1.3  4.1  2.2 
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Table 8. Co-manager Choice, Equity Transactions. 
In Model 1, we estimate the probability that a particular bank is chosen to co-manage a particular equity deal using probit 
MLE with sample selection correction as per Table 4. The first two columns use relative recommendations and relative 
upgrades to model analyst behavior, respectively, instrumented from the equations estimated in Table 5 and so treated as 
endogenous. Analyst behavior is observed only if the bank provides coverage, so column (3) estimates the probability of 
winning a mandate separately if the bank does not provide research coverage. Model 2 in column (4) pools the sample and 
estimates the effect of analyst coverage (irrespective of the level of recommendation) using a seemingly unrelated bivariate 
probit model which treats coverage as endogenous (see Greene, 2003). The first stage of the biprobit SUR model is 
illustrated in Table 4. The dummies for mergers are coded 1 in the quarter of the event, and ½, ⅓, and ¼ in the next three 
quarters. Intercepts are not shown. Standard errors are shown in italics. In the first two columns, they are based on the 
Murphy-Topel adjustment. In column (4), they are clustered on deal id and so heteroskedasticity-consistent. We use ***, **, 
and * to denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level (two-sided), respectively. The number of covered and non-
covered observations in the first three columns is 8,891 and 234,485, respectively. The number of observations in column 
(4) is 244,624. 
 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 Coverage  No coverage  Endogenous 
 
Relative 
recommen- 
dation 
(1)  
Relative 
upgrade 
(2)  (3)  
analyst 
coverage 
model 
(4) 
Analyst behavior        
analyst variable 0.680*  1.664*    1.129*** 
 0.290  0.798    0.049 
Bank-firm relationships        
bank’s share of firm’s debt deals prior 5 years 0.640***  0.703  1.195***  0.891*** 
 0.145  0.371  0.096  0.092 
bank’s share of firm’s equity deals prior 5 years 0.871***  1.024  1.261***  0.782*** 
 0.168  0.631  0.117  0.072 
bank’s share of firm’s loans prior 5 years 0.686***  0.668*  1.175***  1.059*** 
 0.173  0.331  0.082  0.080 
Bank-bank relationships        
bank’s participation in lead’s prior-year syndicates 1.978***  2.937***  2.159***  2.145*** 
 0.308  0.661  0.108  0.105 
lead’s participation in candidate’s prior-year syndicates -0.120  -0.266  0.667***  0.576*** 
 0.244  0.399  0.082  0.074 
bank’s indegree centrality 0.045***  0.031*  0.054***  0.054*** 
 0.008  0.014  0.004  0.003 
bank’s eigenvector centrality  0.852*  0.728  2.704***  2.428*** 
 0.374  0.906  0.088  0.082 
 
 
 
 
 
Continued over 
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Table 8. Co-manager Choice, Equity Transactions (continued). 
 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 Coverage  No coverage  Endogenous 
 
Relative 
recommen- 
dation 
(1)  
Relative 
upgrade 
(2)  (3)  
analyst 
coverage 
model 
(4) 
Bank characteristics        
bank’s equity market share prior calendar year 0.416  -0.343  1.261***  -0.143 
 0.671  1.008  0.117  0.284 
bank’s debt market share prior calendar year 0.361  -1.007  1.195***  -0.673** 
 0.584  1.074  0.096  0.255 
bank’s loan market share prior calendar year 0.131  1.345  1.175***  2.407*** 
 0.768  1.415  0.082  0.239 
abs(lead’s equity market share – bank’s equity market share) -3.211***  -2.852*  -6.542***  -5.815*** 
 0.974  1.338  0.418  0.410 
… x (lead is Top 10 bank) 0.979  0.264  5.968***  4.991*** 
 1.012  1.558  0.396  0.386 
=1 if bank involved in merger  0.097  0.118  0.257***  0.242*** 
 0.078  0.144  0.030  0.027 
Analyst characteristics        
=1 if analyst is ranked ‘all-star’ by Institutional Investor 0.189***  0.209**  0.136***  0.124*** 
 0.042  0.078  0.016  0.015 
relative forecast accuracy 0.355  0.200     
 0.207  0.310    
relative forecast optimism -0.213  -0.232     
 0.159  0.207    
relative coverage intensity -0.375**  -0.909**     
 0.131  0.298    
log analyst’s seniority (in years) 0.081***  0.099*     
 0.021  0.045    
Diagnostics        
Pseudo R2 21.5 %  23.6 %  20.1 %  24.9 % 
Wald test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 495.9***  407.5***  4,330***  15,422*** 
Correlation of coverage and co-manager equations (ρ) 0.263***  0.129***  0.023  0.160*** 
Likelihood ratio test of independent equations (ρ=0) (χ2) 67.6***  18.9***  0.2  34.8*** 
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Table 9. Co-manager Choice, Debt Transactions. 
In Model 1, we estimate the probability that a particular bank is chosen to co-manage a particular debt deal using probit 
MLE with sample selection correction as per Table 4. The first two columns use relative recommendations and relative 
upgrades to model analyst behavior, respectively, instrumented from the equations estimated in Table 5 and so treated as 
endogenous. Analyst behavior is observed only if the bank provides coverage, so column (3) estimates the probability of 
winning a mandate separately if the bank does not provide research coverage. Model 2 in column (4) pools the sample and 
estimates the effect of analyst coverage (irrespective of the level of recommendation) using a seemingly unrelated bivariate 
probit model which treats coverage as endogenous (see Greene, 2003). The first stage of the biprobit SUR model is 
illustrated in Table 4. The dummies for mergers are coded 1 in the quarter of the event, and ½, ⅓, and ¼ in the next three 
quarters. Intercepts are not shown. Standard errors are shown in italics. In the first two columns, they are based on the 
Murphy-Topel adjustment. In column (4), they are clustered on deal id and so heteroskedasticity-consistent. We use ***, **, 
and * to denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level (two-sided), respectively. The number of covered and non-
covered observations in the first three columns is 22,066 and 145,745, respectively. The number of observations in column 
(4) is 170,136. 
 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 Coverage  No coverage  Endogenous 
 
Relative 
recommen- 
dation 
(1)  
Relative 
upgrade 
(2)  (3)  
analyst 
coverage 
model 
(4) 
Analyst behavior        
analyst variable 2.000***  1.415***    0.381*** 
 0.484  0.292    0.035 
Bank-firm relationships        
bank’s share of firm’s debt deals prior 5 years 0.489*  0.988***  0.873***  0.972*** 
 0.244  0.109  0.072  0.055 
bank’s share of firm’s equity deals prior 5 years 0.324  0.605***  0.355***  0.408*** 
 0.253  0.155  0.111  0.062 
bank’s share of firm’s loans prior 5 years 1.250***  1.738***  1.394***  1.398*** 
 0.237  0.192  0.056  0.058 
Bank-bank relationships        
bank’s participation in lead’s prior-year syndicates 1.873***  1.772***  2.436***  2.423*** 
 0.405  0.348  0.135  0.133 
lead’s participation in candidate’s prior-year syndicates 0.011  0.059  0.188*  0.177* 
 0.210  0.185  0.089  0.079 
bank’s indegree centrality 0.081***  0.068***  0.088***  0.082*** 
 0.008  0.007  0.003  0.003 
bank’s eigenvector centrality  2.413***  2.927***  3.167***  3.166*** 
 0.583  0.383  0.090  0.084 
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Table 9. Co-manager Choice, Debt Transactions (continued). 
 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 Coverage  No coverage  Endogenous 
 
Relative 
recommen- 
dation 
(1)  
Relative 
upgrade 
(2)  (3)  
analyst 
coverage 
model 
(4) 
Bank characteristics        
bank’s equity market share prior calendar year -0.699  -0.621  0.355***  -1.110*** 
 0.730  0.670  0.111  0.241 
bank’s debt market share prior calendar year 2.364**  1.390*  0.873***  2.086*** 
 0.751  0.662  0.072  0.280 
bank’s loan market share prior calendar year 0.607  1.596  1.394***  2.655*** 
 1.546  1.256  0.056  0.257 
abs(lead’s debt market share – bank’s debt market share) -5.468***  -6.604***  -5.847***  -6.048*** 
 1.087  0.963  0.476  0.492 
… x (lead is Top 10 bank) 3.502**  6.080***  6.397***  6.356*** 
 1.159  0.952  0.463  0.483 
=1 if bank involved in merger  0.298***  0.328***  0.059*  0.102*** 
 0.090  0.080  0.030  0.027 
Analyst characteristics        
=1 if analyst is ranked ‘all-star’ by Institutional Investor -0.026  0.147***  -0.122***  -0.065*** 
 0.071  0.041  0.021  0.019 
relative forecast accuracy -0.181  0.163     
 0.278  0.191     
relative forecast optimism -0.856**  -0.014     
 0.272  0.105     
relative coverage intensity -0.327*  -0.396**     
 0.133  0.126     
log analyst’s seniority (in years) -0.042  0.019     
 0.042  0.025     
Diagnostics        
Pseudo R2 22.6 %  22.6 %  23.0 %  24.9 % 
Wald test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 2,063***  2,119***  6,660***  21,512*** 
Correlation of coverage and co-manager equations (ρ) 0.131***  0.183***  0.310***  -0.096*** 
Likelihood ratio test of independent equations (ρ=0) (χ2) 16.0***  32.2***  114.1***  21.3*** 
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Table 10. Lead-manager Choice. 
We estimate the probability that a given bank is chosen to lead-manage a particular securities transaction. The specification 
is similar to Model 2, except that the dependent variable equals 1 if the bank won the lead-management mandate, and 0 
otherwise. As before, we concentrate on deals lead-managed by one of the 50 largest underwriters at the time and treat the 
50 largest underwriters as being in competition for each deal. Note that we include deals that do not involve co-managers 
here. There are 6,073 equity deals and 11,056 debt deals in the sample, resulting in 303,680 observations in column (1) and 
551,765 observations in column (3). In columns (2) and (4) we restrict the samples to the 1,870 equity and 1,910 debt deals 
in which the issuer had an exclusive lead-management relationship with one bank and treat the 50 largest underwriters as 
competing for each deal. The models are estimated using a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model which treats 
coverage as endogenous. The first-stage models of the biprobit SUR look similar to those illustrated in Table 4 and are not 
reported. Intercepts are not shown. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (which are clustered on deal id) are shown 
in italics. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level (two-sided), respectively.  
 
 Equity  Debt 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Research coverage        
candidate bank provides coverage -0.033  0.756***  0.094***  0.295*** 
 0.035  0.062  0.021  0.047 
Bank-firm relationships (lead)        
bank’s share of firm’s debt deals as lead prior 5 years 1.162***  0.419***  1.832***  1.858*** 
 0.067  0.115  0.027  0.042 
bank’s share of firm’s equity deals as lead prior 5 years 2.228***  2.082***  0.580***  0.275** 
 0.046  0.058  0.040  0.092 
bank’s share of firm’s loans as lead prior 5 years 0.883***  0.492**  1.273***  1.254*** 
 0.070  0.161  0.033  0.077 
Bank-firm relationships (co-manager)        
bank’s share of firm’s debt deals as co-manager prior 5 yrs 0.275*  -0.056  1.376***  1.266*** 
 0.133  0.220  0.052  0.090 
bank’s share of firm’s equity deals as co-manager prior 5 yrs 0.223***  0.535***  0.312***  -0.098 
 0.059  0.076  0.073  0.173 
Bank and analyst characteristics        
bank’s equity market share prior calendar year 2.347***  2.002  -1.676***  -2.691*** 
 0.236  0.552  0.171  0.474 
bank’s debt market share prior calendar year -0.314  0.906  4.905***  5.667*** 
 0.235  0.530  0.195  0.537 
bank’s loan market share prior calendar year 2.029***  0.888  1.009***  0.640 
 0.246  0.667  0.165  0.426 
bank’s indegree centrality 0.011***  0.014*  0.026***  0.026*** 
 0.003  0.006  0.002  0.004 
bank’s eigenvector centrality  2.798***  2.274***  1.629***  1.334*** 
 0.091  0.211  0.059  0.155 
=1 if bank involved in merger  0.136***  0.059  0.167***  0.212*** 
 0.030  0.071  0.019  0.048 
=1 if bank has all-star analyst covering issuer’s industry 0.130***  0.037  0.027*  -0.056 
 0.015  0.035  0.013  0.032 
Diagnostics        
Pseudo R2 30.7 %  32.6 %  29.0 %  31.4 % 
Wald test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 20,241***  12,343***  58,353***  12,109*** 
Correlation of coverage and co-manager equations (ρ) 0.401***  0.088**  0.031*  -0.014 
Likelihood ratio test of independent equations (ρ=0) (χ2) 247.9***  7.0**  5.3*  0.2 
        
